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ARBITRATION'S SUMMER SOLDIERS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY





We provide the first study of varying use of arbitration clauses across contracts
within the same firms. Using a sample of 26 consumer contracts and 164 noncon-
sumer contracts from large public corporations, we compared the use of arbitration
clauses in firms' consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over three-quarters of the
consumer agreements provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 10% of the
firms' material nonconsume, nonemployment contracts included arbitration
clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions in the vast majority of material con-
tracts suggests that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefe, litigation over
arbitration to resolve disputes with peers. Our data suggest that the frequent use of
arbitration clauses in the same firms' consumer contracts may be an effort to pre-
clude aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed, an effort to
promote fair and efficient dispute resolution.
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration clauses are common features of American consumer
agreements. Popular products such as cellular phone service,
credit cards, and discount brokerage typically come with fine-print
contracts in which customers waive their right to litigate disputes in
court. Knowingly or not, the customer who signs these contracts
agrees to submit disputes to arbitration and, in many cases, agrees
not to participate in aggregate proceedings, either in court or be-
fore an arbitrator.
Mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been
controversial. Supporters of such clauses argue that arbitration is
cheaper, faster, and more effective as a means for dispute
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resolution than litigation.' Professional arbitrators are neutral, out-
comes are at least as favorable to consumers as the outcomes of
litigation, and a majority of participants express satisfaction with
the process.2 Litigation, meanwhile, is seen as antithetical to arbi-
tration because it undermines the speed, simplicity, and financial
3benefits of the arbitration process. More broadly, supporters argue
that mandatory arbitration, coupled with class action waivers,
benefits all consumers by reducing the price of consumer prod-
ucts. Companies save money, and in a competitive market, pass
their savings on to customers.4 Pre-dispute arbitration clauses, in
short, serve the best interests of both companies and consumers.
Opponents of mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts
characterize these clauses as a limited and often unsatisfactory
mode of dispute resolution imposed by economically powerful
corporations on unsophisticated consumers without genuine con-
1. See, e.g., Discover Bank's Answer to Amicus Curie [sic] Brief of Consumer Attorneys
of California in Support of Real Party in Interest at 13-14, Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (No. S113725) (arguing that arbitration provides consumers with
an advantageous forum); Brief of Respondent Cingular Wireless, Scott v. Cingular Wireless,
161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007) (No. 77406-4) (citing legislative history of the FAA); Christo-
pher R. Drahazol, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 729, 736-42
(2006) (discussing the costs of arbitration); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
REsOL. 559, 563-66 (2001) (discussing savings in time and costs through arbitration); Lewis
L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
29, 54-55, 57 (1998) (discussing the comparative speed and cost-effectiveness of arbitration
in employment settings); Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionabil-
ity, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 761, 763-69 (2003) (enumerating benefits of arbitration over
litigation).
2. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Dis-
putes?: An Analysis of Active Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'LJ. CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 378 (1995)
(reporting favorable employee win-rates in employment-related arbitration); Maltby, supra
note 1, at 45-51 (citing studies of win-rates, awards, and participant satisfaction in arbitra-
tion and litigation); Mogilnicki & Jensen, supra note 1, at 763-65 (citing studies of outcomes
in arbitration and litigation).
3. See, e.g., Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affir-
mance, Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial
Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 94;Joshua S. Lipshutz,
Note, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the Juncture of Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1677, 1710 (2005).
4. See Ware, supra note 3. Ware lists a variety of ways in which arbitration reduces the
costs of dispute resolution for companies: high damages are less likely, defendant companies
avoid adverse publicity, procedures are nationally uniform, discovery and appeals are lim-
ited, class actions may be avoided, and, more generally, claims may be deterred altogether.
Id. at 90. Of course, deterring claims means that victims of corporate wrongdoing obtain no
relief for violations of their legal rights; overall, however, consumers might be willing to
forego legal remedies for minor wrongs in exchange for lower-priced goods and services. See




sent.5 Consumers are deprived ofjury trials; instead their claims are
judged by private arbitrators who may seek to ingratiate themselves
with companies that frequently use their services.6 Damage awards
may be lower in arbitration than in litigation, though evidence
supporting this claim is inconclusive." Critics also maintain that
mandatory arbitration of consumer disputes is detrimental to the
public interest in open resolution of legal controversies. Arbitra-
tion proceedings are typically private and do not result in
published opinions; therefore, decisions rendered by arbitrators
contribute nothing to the body of law, have little deterrent effect
on future wrongdoing, and fail to stimulate interest in legal re-
form."
Opponents of mandatory consumer arbitration are particularly
critical of arbitration agreements in which consumers waive their
right to initiate or join in aggregate disputes, in or out of
5. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Con-
tracts: A Call For Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237, 1246-49 (2001) (emphasizing adhesion);
Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious
Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 267, 328 (1995) (emphasizing
adhesion); LindaJ. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predis-
pute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer Experience, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73-
74 (2004) (concluding that consumer arbitration clauses are not fully voluntary and restrict
consumers' substantive rights); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. Rav. 761, 787-89 (2002) (emphasizing differences in
bargaining power); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 36, 58-60, 132
(1997) (emphasizing adhesion); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?,
57 STAN L. Rav. 1631, 1648-53, 1671-72 (2005) (cataloguing criticisms).
6. Studies finding that consumers often win contested arbitrations, according to
these critics, are unrepresentative because they involve relatively sophisticated consumers.
See Budnitz, supra note 5, at 320-21; Sternlight, Creeping Arbitration, supra note 5, at 1659
(same).
7. Estreicher, supra note 1, 565 tbl.4 (2001) (showing lower median awards in arbitra-
tion of employment cases); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 64-65 (reviewing imprecise evidence
and noting that limited empirical evidence raises a serious concern).
8. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. RESOL. J. 44 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004) (finding no
significant difference between litigation and arbitration awards); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J.
Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors
with Legal Professionals, 78 IowA L. REV. 883, 890-93 (1993) (statistical tests on arbitrator-
mock juror samples yielded no statistically significant difference in the median or mean
awards); Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothe-
sis, 5 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 61 (2003) (finding little evidence of difference between juror and
arbitrator outcomes in California automobile accident cases).
9. See Alderman, supra note 5, at 1262-64 (arguing that arbitration detracts from de-
velopment of law); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 298-303 (2004) (finding mandatory arbitration
to be incompatible with democratic values); Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1661-65 (discussing
transparency, public education, and the rule of law).
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arbitration.'0 Class actions and other forms of aggregate dispute
resolution, they argue, are necessary to apprise consumers of cor-
porate malfeasance, to make litigating small claims economically
viable, and to hold companies accountable for wrongdoing that
results in small losses to many customers. Thus, waivers of aggre-
gate dispute resolution defeat both the rights of individual
consumers and the public's interest in enlisting private litigants to
enforce the law." Avoiding aggregate actions may save money for
companies, these critics say, but there is no guarantee that the sav-
ings will be passed on to consumers, and in any event public
interests in law enforcement trump private interests in lower prices
for consumer products.
Mirroring this public policy debate is a vibrant pattern of litiga-
tion pitting consumers and consumer advocates against big
corporations. Arbitration clauses are raised by corporate defen-
dants in such cases as a defense against class action treatment.
2
Plaintiffs typically contend that standard-form contract provisions
combining mandatory arbitration with class action waivers are
unconscionable under state contract law.'3 In the ensuing litiga-
tion, the parties have vigorously debated the justifiability of
arbitration clauses, with major trade and consumer organizations
participating as amici curiae on the expected sides. 4 Decisions on
10. SeeJean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
75, 103 (2004) (referring to the combination of mandatory arbitration and class action
waiver as "do-it-yourself tort reform" by companies).
11. See Budnitz, supra note 5, at 322-23 (noting an adverse effect on "public" disputes);
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. Rlv. 373, 430 (2005) (discussing the public benefits of class actions);
Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 157, 170-
77 (2006) (arguing that low value claims are not viable on an individual basis, leaving com-
panies unaccountable for violations of law); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 53 (referring to
"Corporate Self-Deregulation"); Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1251-52 (arguing that compa-
nies use arbitration to shield themselves from legal liability); Sternlight &Jensen, supra note
10, at 85-92 (arguing that financial and informational obstacles to arbitration allow compa-
nies to escape liability).
12. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007).
13. See, e.g., id.
14. For example, in a recent case before the Supreme Court of Washington, Scott v.
Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007), Cingular's position was defended by the
United States Chamber of Commerce, CTIA-The Wireless Association, Aniazon.com, Intel,
Microsoft and others, and the plaintiff's position was supported by the Washington State
Trial Lawyers Association, AARP, and the National Association of Consumer Advocates. See
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of Respondent
Cingular Wireless, Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4); Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4); Brief of Ama-
zon.com, Intel Corp., Microsoft Corp. and Real networks as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4); Brief of Amicus Curiae Wash. State Trial
Lawyers Ass'n Found., Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4); Brief Amici Curiae of AARP &
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the question of unconscionability, in both federal 15 and state6
courts, have been mixed.
Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, Scott, 161 P.3d 1000 (No. 77406-4). Similarly, in Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), Discover was supported by The U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, the American Bankers' Association, the American Financial Services
Association, the Consumer Bankers' Association, the Consumer Attorneys of California, and
others. Application of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. for Permission
to File Supplemental Brief and Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. in Support of Defendant-Petitioner, Discover, 113 P.3d 1100 (No.
S113725); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Bankers Ass'n, Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n & Consumer
Bankers Ass'n in Support of Petitioner Discover Bank at 7, Discover, 113 P.3d 1100 (No.
S113725). Plaintiffs were supported by AARP, the National Association of Consumer Advo-
cates, and others. See Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Christopher Boehr, Real
Party in Interest, Discover, 113 P.3d 1100 (No. S113725); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Consumer Advocates in Support of Real Party in Interest, Discover, 113 P.3d 1100
(No. S113725); Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumer Attorneys of Cal. In Support of Real Part
in Interest Christopher Boehr, Discover, 113 P.3d 1100 (No. S113725).
15. Compare, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (invalidating
arbitration agreements barring antitrust treble damages, class actions, and attorney fees),
Edwards v. Blockbuster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308-09 (E.D. Okla. 2005) (upholding
membership agreement's prohibition on class action participation), Luna v. Household Fin.
Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178-79 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (finding waiver of class action
rights unfair and emphasizing the class action's importance in vindicating consumer rights),
and Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000)
(invalidating waiver of class remedies and declaratory and injunctive relief as substantively
unconscionable), with, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003)
(enforcing arbitration clause effectively precluding class action remedy), Snowden v.
CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the "argument that
the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable as unconscionable because without the class
action vehicle, she [the plaintiff] will be unable to maintain her legal representation given
the small amount of her individual damages."), Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244
F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001) (same) andjohnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 379
(3d Cir. 2000) ("claims arising uinder the EFTA [Electronic Fund Transfer Act] may also be
subject to arbitration notwithstanding the desire of a plaintiff who previously consented to
arbitration to bring his or her claims as part of a class.").
16. Compare, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 E3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir.
2007) (finding an employment contract's class action waiver in an arbitration clause uncon-
scionable under Massachusetts law), Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147-52 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding ban on class claims procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California
law), Discover, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (finding that some waivers of class arbitration in con-
sumer class action are unconscionable uinder California law), S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v.
Chrzanowski, Nos. 1D06-5664, 1D06-5662, 2007 WL 4145222 at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov.
26, 2007) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause precluding class relief), Powertel, Inc. v.
Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (same), Muhammad v. County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100-01 (N.J. 2006) (holding deprivation of class-wide action
unconscionable), Scott, 161 P.3d, at 1005-06 (holding that a class action waiver in an arbitra-
tion clause violates public policy), State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278-79 (W.
Va. 2002) (holding retailer's contract prohibiting class relief unenforceable), with, e.g., Leo-
nard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So.2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002), Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857
N.E.2d 250, 277 (IIl. 2006), Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., No. 86810, 2006-Ohio-3353, 36, 2006
WL 2243649 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2006), Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d
940, 951 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding unconscionable ban on class actions), Whitney v.
Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding arbitration clause
stripping class action right substantively unconscionable), Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912
A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2006), and Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v.Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 175 (Wis.
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A growing body of literature attempts to measure the incidence
of mandatory arbitration in different types of contracts. The litera-
ture to date, however, has been limited because it examines only
particular types of contracts and does not control for the contract-
ing parties. This study adds to the literature by investigating
whether particular firms vary use of arbitration clauses depending
on the type of contract. Do firms uniformly include arbitration
clauses, or do they vary their practice based on the nature of the
contract? Our aim is to explore whether firms are consistent in
their contractual practices across consumer and nonconsumer
contracts.
The results are striking. Over three-quarters of the studied com-
panies' consumer agreements provided for mandatory arbitration
of disputes.17 Yet less than 10% of their negotiated nonconsumer,
non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses.' 8 The ab-
sence of arbitration provisions in the great majority of negotiated
business contracts suggests that companies value, even prefer, liti-
gation as the means for resolving disputes with peers. The
systematic eschewing of arbitration clauses in business-to-business
contracts also casts doubt on the corporations' asserted beliefs in
the superior fairness and efficiency of arbitration clauses.
Given that large corporations reveal a clear preference for litiga-
tion over arbitration in their business-to-business contracts, the
frequent inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts requires explanation. One plausible hypothesis is that
these provisions are intended to preclude aggregate dispute reso-
lution by remitting the consumer to an individual action before an
arbitrator. The strategy of precluding aggregate treatment of con-
sumer grievances is potentially beneficial to corporations because
few individual consumers will find it worthwhile to pursue their
claims on an individual basis, either in litigation or in arbitration.
To the extent these clauses are effective at preventing aggregate
dispute resolution, therefore, they may eliminate any effective con-
sumer remedy for defective products or services.
2006) (questioning whether class action waiver in arbitration clause would be enforceable)
with, e.g., Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (class arbitration
waiver "is not unconscionable per se"); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 629 S.E.2d
865, 875 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), Spann v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 224 S.W.3d
698, 714-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (enforcing class arbitration waiver under Utah law), and
AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that waiver
of class action rights in arbitration clause is not unfair because it does not eliminate a sub-
stantive right); see also Tyler M. Paetkau, Drafting Employment-Related Agreements, PLI Order
No. 11091, at 277-78 (Oct. 2007) (listing additional cases).
17. See infra text accompanying note 49.
18. See infra text accompanying note 50.
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Part I of this Article discusses prior empirical research on arbi-
tration clauses and outlines our research hypotheses. Part II
describes the data, Part III reports the results, Part IV discusses the
results, and Part V provides additional evidence for our thesis.
I. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
Prior Research. Empirical studies show a reasonably consistent
pattern of arbitration clause use. The data show that arbitration
clauses appear more frequently in consumer agreements than in
other contracts, but also that substantial variation exists across
types of contracts. In the securities industry, arbitration clauses are
routinely used for resolving disputes between brokers and custom-
ers.'9 Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler report arbitration
clauses in about 35% of consumer contracts with rates varying by
the type of contract; for example, 69% of twenty-six consumer fi-
nancial contracts, including credit card contracts, contained
arbitration clauses compared to 0% of twenty consumer food and
entertainment contracts." Florencia Marotta-Wurgler found that
about 6% of 597 online end-user software license agreements con-
tained arbitration clauses,2 ' although some of these would not
necessarily be consumer contracts. Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller,
and John Rolph found that 9% of a sample of California physicians
and hospitals used arbitration agreements, 2  but it was reported at
about the same time that the health care and health insurance in-
dustries had begun to require customers to agree to binding
arbitration. 3 In a study of nonconsumer contracts, Eisenberg and
Miller reported arbitration clauses in about 11% of material con-
tracts of large corporate firms.24 As in the case of consumer
agreements, the rate of arbitration clauses in material contracts
19. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, & Adam C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators
(Working Paper, Jan. 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086372 (offering
an empirical study of arbitrations involving securities brokers and investors); Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
20. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 5, at 63-64 & tbl.2.
21. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007).
22. Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in Health Care:
Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 171 (1997).
23. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 53-54.
24. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Right From Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv.
335, 350 (2007). For other reports of rates of arbitration clauses, see id. at 346-48.
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varied substantially depending on contract type. For example, one-
third of licensing agreements contained arbitration clauses,
whereas none of the trust agreements studied contained such
clauses.25 Employment contracts of senior executives have relatively
high rates of arbitration clauses, with reports of clauses in 41.6%
and 37% of executive contracts, 26 rates that exceed the approxi-
mately one-third rate Demaine and Hensler reported for consumer
contracts.
Contract-level studies, however, cannot fully reveal individual
firms' preferences with respect to arbitration and related clauses.
Studying a firm's pattern of arbitration clause use provides infor-
mation about the firm's true preferences about arbitration clauses.
To detect firm-level patterns, one should observe multiple con-
tracts per firm across a range of contractual situations. This is the
research strategy employed in this Article.
Hypotheses. Our core hypotheses are simple. First, the companies
we studied, or organizations to which they belong, have publicly
endorsed the virtues of arbitration, particularly in the context of
challenges to pre-dispute arbitration clauses and related class ac-
tion waivers in consumer agreements. Arbitration, they maintain,
"takes less time and costs less than litigation;" 27 it is "fair and effec-
tive; ", s and it offers "a quick, cheap, and easy dispute resolution
mechanism"29 that is "more efficient '30 than resolving disputes
through litigation. Based on these assertions, we would expect that
companies would consistently contract for dispute resolution
through arbitration in all types of contracts and disputes.
Second, the stated justifications for mandatory arbitration typi-
cally apply to all types of disputes; they do not distinguish between
consumer and other cases, for example. Thus our second hypothe-
sis is that contracts will consistently require arbitration regardless
of the nature of the contract or the identity of the counterparty.
Third, arbitration clauses are one of a suite of possible dispute
resolution clauses present in many contracts. Most closely related
to arbitration clauses are contract terms relating to jury trials. Arbi-
tration clauses preclude litigation and, therefore, constitute a way
25. Eisenberg & Miller, id. at 351 tbl.2.
26. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 234 (2006)
(41.6%); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 24, at 351 tbl.2 (37%).
27. Brief of CTIA, supra note 3, at 2. Similar citations of the benefits of arbitration ap-
pear in Cingular's brief. Brief of Respondent Cingular Wireless at 39, Scott v. Cingular
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007) (No. 550284).
28. Brief of CTIA, supra note 3, at 2.
29. Discover Bank's Answer, supra note 1, at 13-14.
30. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Bankers Ass'n, et al., supra note 14, at 7.
[VOL. 41:4878
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of effectively avoiding jury trials. But mandatory arbitration clauses
are not the only way to avoid a jury. In the federal courts and in
most states, contract terms expressly waiving jury trials preserve
access to court but avoid jury trials."' Some tort reform proponents
regard jury trials as a distinct source of problems with the U.S. le-
gal system.32 Some researchers claim that juries are poorly suited to
address matters of punitive damages.3 And large jury awards have
been made in litigation between business firms. 4 By agreeing ex
31. Knowing and voluntary pre-dispute contractual waivers of the civil right to a jury
trial are enforced in federal courts. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832
(4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 E2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985); Rodenbur
v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1963); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F.
Supp 2d 811, 813-14 (N.D. Tex. 2002). The majority of state courts agree. See, e.g., L & R
Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 756 (Conn. 1998); Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v.
Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 626-627 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam); Lowe Enter. Residen-
tial Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 40 P.3d 405, 410 (Nev. 2002); R.I.
Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Coffey and Martinelli, Ltd., 821 A.2d 222, 226 (R.I. 2003); In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132-33 (Tex. 2004); see alsoJay M. Zitter, Con-
tractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.5Tn 53, 71 (1996). California and
Georgia reject at least some pre-dispute waivers. See, e.g., Grafton Partners v. Superior Court,
116 P.3d 479, 492 (Cal. 2005) (rejecting waiver of jury right); Bank South, N.A. v. Howard,
444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994) (limiting waiver of jury solely to when parties make no de-
mand for a jury trial, or agree by stipulation filed in court); see also Miss. R. Civ. P. 38(b)
("The court may, in its discretion, require that the action be tried by ajury notwithstanding
the stipulation of waiver.").
32. This widely held corporate view regards juries as increasing the risks and costs of
trials because they decide the questions put to them on the basis of legally irrelevant factors
rather than according to the evidence and applicable law. E.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in
Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 51-
52 (1998). For a broader description of this view and the evidence for and against it, see
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical
Study ofJury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539,
587 (2007) (describing and weighing evidence of various hypotheses influencing jury trial
waiver rates and finding corporations often "assign a positive value" to juries).
33. E.g., Cass Sunstein et al., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HowJURIEs DECIDE (2002).
34. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (uphold-
ing a $10 million jury award in business dispute); IGEN Int'l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics
GmbH, 335 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2003) (reducing jury award of about $505 million by over
80% by striking some compensatory and all punitive damages); 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Ban-
ques Paribas (Suisse), S.A., 180 F.3d 247, 256-59 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking only punitive
damages from jury award in excess of $150 million); City of Hope Nat'l Med. Ctr. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., 20 Cal Rptr. 3d 234, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and depublished by
105 P.3d 543 (Cal. 2005) (awarding $300,164,130 compensatory damages, $200 million pu-
nitive damages); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 563 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. App.
2002) ($257 million punitive award), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 977 (2003); Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. v. Am. Fin. Mortgage Corp., 855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004) (striking large jury
award); COC Serv., Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2004) (upholding
trial court's JNOV striking large punitive damages award), review denied, June 9, 2006; Mi-
cro/Vest v. Computerland (awarding an estimated $400 million in compensatory damages in
ajury trial), reported inJoni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide, 33J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 tbl.1 (2006); Rubicon Petrol. Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., reported in Amoco
Loses Oilfield Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at D16 (awarding $417 million in a jury trial);
Amoco Chem. Co. v. Certain Underwriter's at Lloyd's of London, No. B083904, 1996 WL
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ante to avoid jury trials, businesses can avoid the perceived risk of a
runaway jury granting possibly bankrupting. Based on the business
community's expressed attitudes towards juries, one expects busi-
nesses to seek to avoid that risk. Our third hypothesis, therefore, is
that even when an arbitration clause is absent, contracts will waive
jury trials for all types of contracts and counterparties.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
We identified a number of companies with significant market
shares or name recognition in the telecommunications, credit, and
financial services industries. Most are in the top 100 of American
companies listed in Fortune magazine's annual ranking; 5 others are
close to the top 100 or are well-known within the relevant con-
sumer sector. Next, we collected consumer agreements drafted by
the companies. Some of these were available to anyone visiting the
web site on which the company marketed its products. Others were
available through a link or window that appeared during the proc-
ess of placing an order. Others were available only by mail after
ordering the company's product.36 We searched for versions of
these agreements current in July and August, 2007. In the industry
sectors we studied, consumer agreements typically regulated an
ongoing relationship between the company and the consumer,
such as phone service, brokerage, or credit.
We then searched for negotiated agreements entered into by the
same companies. Our sources for these contracts were the compa-
nies' Form 8-K and Form 10-K filings during the period from
January 1, 2006 to August 13, 2007. The SEC requires registered
companies to file current and annual reports listing, among other
407855 (Cal. App. June 4, 1996) (reversing large jury award). In MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow
Jones & Co., 987 ESupp. 535 (S.D. Tex. 1997), ajury awarded $220,720,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages. After a retrial was ordered, see Felicity Barringer, Judge Says Record
Libel Case Should Be Retried, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999, at C1, it is reported that MMAR did not
pursue the case. See David McHam, Law & the Media in Texas: Handbook for Journalists,
available at http://www.texaspress.com/Lawpress/LawMedia/Libel/TexasLibelCases.htm.
See also THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL AND HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS (1987) (de-
scribing in detail a multi-billion dollar jury award in a corporate control battle).
35. Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/fulllist/.
36. For example, Walmart (Fortune's #1) provides credit card applicants with a disclo-
sure statement at the time of application, then mails the full consumer agreement to the
customer when the application is accepted. Telephone requests for an advance copy of the
agreement, prior to submission of an application containing personal financial information,
were declined on the ground that the company did not furnish its contracts to "just anyone."
Telephone Interview with Walmart Customer Service (June 15, 2007). The consumer con-
tract that Walmart sends is in fact a contract with GE Money Bank.
[VOL. 41:4
Arbitration's Summer Soldiers
things, contracts that materially affect the financial condition of
the company. 7 Contracts filed by the companies we studied in-
cluded stock purchase agreements; credit and security agreements;
loan pooling and service agreements; employment agreements;
and various agreements relating to benefits and incentives for key
employees. Given the economic significance of these contracts-
implied by their inclusion in Forms 8-K and 10-K-we assume that
they were negotiated with care.
Our data include 26 consumer agreements drafted by 21 com-
panies and 164 negotiated, material contracts entered into by the
same companies. Fourteen of the negotiated contracts were em-
ployment agreements. Sorting by industry, seven of our companies
(accounting for seven consumer contracts and sixty-three negoti-
ated contracts) provide telecommunications services; five
companies (accounting for seven consumer contracts and thirty-
eight negotiated contracts) provide "triple play" cable services
(CATV, Internet, and phone); four companies provide securities
services (accounting for four consumer agreements and thirty-
three negotiated agreements); three companies are commercial
banks (accounting for five consumer agreements and fourteen ne-
gotiated contracts); two companies issue retail credit cards
(accounting for two consumer contracts and eight negotiated con-
tracts); and one company is a financial credit company
(accounting for one consumer contract and eight negotiated con-
tracts). Table 1 reports the companies studied and the number of
each kind of contract for each company.
TABLE 1
COMPANIES AND CONTRACT TYPES
Contract Type
Company Consumer Employment Material Contracts Total
AT&T 1 0 17 18
AlItel 1 0 12 13
American Express 1 0 8 9
Ameriprise 1 0 7 8
Ameritrade 1 6 8 15
Bank of America 1 0 6 7
Cablevision 3 0 7 10
CellularOne 1 3 9 13
Chares Schwab 2 0 11 13
Charter Commun. 1 1 9 11
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78o(d) (2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11,
249.308, 249.310 (2007).
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Contract Type
Company Consumer Employment Material Contracts Total
Chase 2 0 6 8
Citigroup 2 0 2 4
Comcast 1 0 10 11
Cox 1 0 1 2
E-Trade 1 0 1 2
GE/GE Money Banlk 1 0 8 9
Qwest 1 1 7 9
Sprint 1 3 3 7
Time Warner 1 0 10 11
U.S. Cellular 1 0 5 6
Verizon 1 0 3 4
Total 26 14 150 190
'GE Money Bank describes itself as "the consumer and small business financial services unit of General
Electric."'4 Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K
filings, Jan. 1, 2006 to Aug. 13, 2007.
We coded both consumer agreements and negotiated contracts
for the presence of mandatory arbitration clauses,39 class action
waivers, jury trial waivers, choice of law provisions, forum selection
clauses, and provisions for payment of costs, including attorneys'
fees. If the contract required arbitration, we coded for waivers of
class arbitration, waivers of class action treatment, rules governing
arbitration, arbitration venue selection, and provisions on fees. We
also noted and coded for a fairly common non-severability provision
stating that, in the event that a waiver of class treatment is found to
be unenforceable, the entire agreement to arbitrate is nullified.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We report results for (1) arbitration clauses, (2) waivers of class
treatment and related terms, and (3) waivers ofjury trial.
A. Arbitration Clauses, Class Action Waivers
Table 2 reports the rate of arbitration clauses by major contract
type. Over 75% of the consumer agreements we examined in-
38. GE Money, About Us, http://www.gemoney.com/about_us/index.htmnl (last visited
Apr. 5, 2008).
39. Some clauses provided for arbitration at the election of either party. Because the
company can elect arbitration, we count these as mandatory.
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cluded mandatory arbitration clauses. This rate can usefully be
compared with the arbitration clause rates in the material contracts
in the EDGAR data base. The EDGAR material contracts can sub-
divided into employment contracts and other contracts. Over 90%
of the EDGAR employment agreements included arbitration
clauses.40 The consumer contracts and employment contracts arbi-
tration clause rates are strikingly different from the rates in
nonconsumer material contracts (contracts in the EDGAR data-
base other than employment contracts). These material contracts
included arbitration clauses only at about a 6% rate. The differ-
ence between the nonconsumer contract rate and the rate for
consumer and employment contracts is highly statistically signifi-
cant (p<0.001). Even including employment contracts, less than
10% of the negotiated contracts we examined contained arbitra-
tion clauses.41 At the individual firm level, only eight of twenty-one
firms had any nonconsumer, nonemployment contract that pro-
vided for arbitration. None of these eight firms provided for
arbitration in more than one material contract. In sum, the data
establish that the large companies in our data overwhelmingly se-
lected arbitration as the method for resolving consumer disputes
and permitted litigation as the method for resolving business dis-
putes.
TABLE 2
RATE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES BY CONTRACT TYPE
Arbitration Clause
Contract type No Yes Total
Consumer (N) 6 20 26
Percent 23.1 76.9 100.0
Employment (N) 1 13 14
Percent 7.1 92.9 100.0
Material contract (N) 138 9 147
Percent 93.9 6.1 100.0
Total (N) 145 42 187
Percent 76.3 23.7 100.0
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and
Form 1O-K, Jan. 1,2006 to Aug. 13, 2007.
40. Three executive agreements relating to executive departures in the case of corpo-
rate takeovers provided for arbitration at the executive's option. We do not count those as
contracts containing mandatory arbitration clauses.
41. This is consistent with findings reported by Eisenberg and Miller. See Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 24, at 350-51 & tbl.2 (finding an average of 89% of contracts do not man-
date arbitration).
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B. Waivers of Class Treatment and Related Terms
The pattern of class-related provisions in these contracts is also
instructive. Table 3 shows that every consumer contract with an ar-
bitration clause also included a waiver of classwide arbitration.
Table 4 shows that, in 60% of the consumer contracts that con-
tained mandatory arbitration clauses, companies' contracts
deemed those clauses void if the arbitration process allows for
classwide activity.2 Table 5 shows that, independent of arbitration
clauses, 80% of consumer contracts waived class action litigation
rights. Moreover, in a result not shown in the tables, the presence
of a clause waiving class action litigation rights only appeared in
contracts with arbitration clauses. No litigation class action waivers
were found in consumer or other contracts in the absence of an
arbitration clause.
These three clauses-waivers of classwide arbitration, non-
severability clauses voiding the arbitration agreement in the event
classwide arbitration is granted, and waivers of class action litiga-
tion-are each significantly more prevalent for consumer than for
business-to-business and employment contracts. The differences in
all three tables between consumer and nonconsumer contracts are
statistically significant at p<0.001.
TABLE 3
PATTERN OF CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVER IN
CONTRACTS WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Class Arbitration Waiver
Contract type No Yes Total
Consumer (N) 0 20 20
Percent 0.0 100.0 100.0
Employment (N) 13 0 13
Percent 100.0 0.0 100.0
Material contract (N) 5 2 7
Percent 71.4 28.6 100.0
Total (N) 18 22 40
Percent 45.0 55.0 100.0




PATTERN OF VOID ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE
EVENT OF CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION
Arbitration Clause Void If Class Action Waiver Clause Void
Contract type No Yes Total
Consumer (N) 8 12 20
Percent 40.0 60.0 100.0
Employment (N) 13 0 13
Percent 100.0 0.0 100.0
Material contract (N) 7 0 7
Percent 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total (N) 28 12 40
Percent 70.0 30.0 100.0
TABLE 5
PATTERN OF CLASS ACTION WAIVER IN
CONTRACTS WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Class Action Waiver
Contract type No Yes Total
Consumer (N) 4 16 20
Percent 20.0 80.0 100.0
Employment (N) 13 0 13
Percent 100.0 0.0 100.0
Material contract (N) 5 2 7
Percent 71.4 28.6 100.0
Total (N) 22 18 40
Percent 55.0 45.0 100.0
Sources for Tables 3, 4, and 5. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and
Form 10-K filings, Jan. 1,2006 to Aug. 13, 2007.
C. Jury Trial Waiver
Table 6 reports on the pattern of jury trial waivers. The table's
leftmost two columns limit the sample to contracts not containing
mandatory arbitration clauses to isolate jury trial clauses in con-
tracts in which jury trial clauses are unaffected by arbitration
clauses. Column (1)'s and (2)'s "Material contract" rows show that
only about 25% of 138 material contracts contained express jury
trial waivers. This is consistent with prior work on jury trials, which
shows low rates of jury trial waiver, about 20%, for large
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corporations' business-to-business contracts.43 Interestingly, none of
the consumer contracts that lacked mandatory arbitration provi-
sions contained waivers of jury trial.
Columns (3) and (4) account for the fact that arbitration clauses
implicitly waive jury trials. Treating arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers results in only about 30% of material contracts precluding
jury trials-a result consistent with Eisenberg and Miller's prior
study.4 The situation is otherwise with respect to consumer and
employment contracts. Because these contracts had high rates of
mandatory arbitration, most of these contracts effectively avoided
juries even when they lacked an explicit jury trial waiver.
TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF JURY TRIAL WAIVER CLAUSES BY CONTRACT TYPE
Sample limited to contracts Arbitration clauses treated as
without arbitration clauses jury trial waivers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contract type No jury trial Jury trial waiver No iury trial Jury trial waiverwaiver waiver
Consumer (N) 6 0 6 20
Percent 100.0 0 23.1 76.9
Employment (N) 1 0 1 13
Percent 100.0 0 7.1 92.9
Material contract (N) 103 35 103 44
Percent 74.6 25.4 70.1 29.9
Total (N) 110 35 110 77
Percent 75.9 24.1 58.8 41.2
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K filings,
Jan. 1,2006 to Aug. 13, 2007. Columns (3) and (4) treat arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers.
IV. DISCUSSION
None of our hypotheses was confirmed. The companies in our
data set do not uniformly include arbitration clauses in their con-
tracts; less than one quarter (23.7%) of the contracts studied
contained such clauses. Nor is the pattern of mandatory arbitration
uniform across contract type. Arbitration clauses appear routinely
in employment contracts (92.9%), frequently in consumer con-
tracts (76.9%), and rarely in material nonemployment
nonconsumer contracts (6.1%). And the companies in our data set
43. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 32, at 553 tbl.2.
44. Because arbitration clauses opt out of all litigation, arbitration clauses may reflect a
dislike ofjudges as well as juries as decision-makers. Id. at 552-53.
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do not routinely flee jury trials. Only 24.1% of the contracts con-
tained explicit waivers of jury trials. Even when arbitration clauses
are treated as jury trial waivers the overall rate of jury trial waiver
was only 41.2%. As in the case of arbitration clauses, the pattern
differs depending on the type of contract: because so many em-
ployment and consumer contracts contained arbitration clauses,
the effective jury trial waiver rates for these contracts were also
high when arbitration clauses are considered jury waivers.
What explains these results? The low rate of mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in material nonlabor contracts suggests that the
companies in our data set did not, in fact, view the purported ad-
vantages of arbitration as compelling when it came to resolving
important business-to-business disputes. This result suggests rea-
sons for doubting the arguments of some arbitration advocates,
which would imply that rational actors would always prefer arbitra-
tion over litigation.
Other explanations, more favorable towards arbitration, can be
proposed. As noted in Eisenberg and Miller's prior work, for ex-
ample, bargaining dynamics may deter parties from demanding
mandatory arbitration even when arbitration would be in the joint
interest of the parties (the reason is that demanding arbitration
could signal that the party may be inclined to breach the con-
tract).45 Alternatively, perhaps the parties anticipate that they might
agree ex post to arbitrate disputes, and thus their failure to agree
to ex ante mandatory arbitration is not, strictly speaking, an out-
right rejection of arbitration (although, in this case, their revealed
preference for keeping the litigation option open does indicate
that they believe litigation might be preferable in some or even
many cases) . It appears, however, that the simplest explanation is
the most plausible: the parties' revealed preference indicates that
arbitration, for them, is often seen as less desirable than litigation
as a means for resolving disputes.
Also requiring explanation is the remarkable contrast between
employment and consumer contracts, with high rates of mandatory
arbitration, and material nonemployment contracts, with low rates
of arbitration. In the case of employment contracts, we conjecture
that both parties perceive a need for confidentiality in the resolu-
tion of the dispute. The senior employees covered by these
contracts are often in the public eye. Neither the employer nor the
45. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 24, at 369.
46. We thank Dan Crane for this suggestion.
47. Our evidence only includes material contracts in the EDGAR data so we offer no
conclusions about these companies' less sizable contracts, or about contracts of smaller
companies.
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employee stands to gain in terms of reputation of the dirty linen of
their dispute is aired in public.
What about the disparity between rates of arbitration clauses in
consumer and material nonlabor contracts? Concerns for confi-
dentiality cannot explain these data. The most plausible
explanation here is that companies wish to avoid aggregate dispute
resolution.48
The theory is as follows. Companies prefer individual over ag-
gregate dispute resolution because aggregate treatment creates
overwhelming settlement pressure"' and because few consumers
will seek redress on an individual basis due to lack of information
or the small amounts in dispute.0 Companies could attempt to ad-
dress this problem by imposing waivers of class action litigation in
their consumer contracts. But such waivers would be politically
controversial and also would face a risk of being declared uncon-
scionable by courts. The mandatory arbitration clause is a
preferable alternative. Such clauses, if effective, may have the same
result as class action waivers: they prevent class actions and remit
consumers to individual actions which, in light of the stakes, are
usually not worthwhile to pursue. But mandatory arbitration
clauses are easier to sell and enforce than class action waivers. Be-
cause arbitration is often seen as cheaper and simpler than
litigation, the company can claim that it is helping rather than
hurting its customers. This reduces political costs and also in-
creases the prospects that the clause will be upheld in court. In
short, mandatory arbitration offers companies an opportunity to
claim that they are concerned for consumer welfare while simulta-
neously denying their customers any practical avenue for redress.
A possible objection to the theory that companies are using arbi-
tration clauses to avoid group dispute resolution is that such a
tactic would be useless if the result was to substitute classwide arbi-
48. Our study thus provides support for commentators who claim that corporations
are including arbitration clauses in consumer contracts as a device to avoid class action liti-
gation. SeeGilles, supra note 11, at 391-412; Sternlight &Jensen, supra note 10. At least one
court has taken account of the much higher rates of arbitration clauses in companies' con-
sumer contracts than in the business contracts. Sutton Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth
Mobility, Inc., 971 So. 2d 1257, 1267-68 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that an arbitration
clause contained in defendants' standard form consumer contract was not subject to nego-
tiation with individual consumers but that defendant was willing "to dispense with
arbitration provisions in its dealings with non-consumers").
49. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1872, 1879-95 (2006) (discussing le-
gitimate and illegitimate settlement pressures).
50. See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 11, at 170-77 (noting that consumers cannot
afford to arbitrate small claims on an individual basis); Sternlight &Jensen, supra note 10, at
86--87 (same).
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tration for class action litigation. If an arbitration could be brought
on a class basis, the advantages described above could be lost.5' But
the contracts in our sample also take account of this possibility.
Every one of the consumer contracts that provided for mandatory
arbitration also contained clauses waiving classwide arbitration.
Again, the evidence suggests that the companies wished to avoid all
forms of aggregate dispute resolution.
What about the fact that 60% of the consumer contracts that
contained arbitration clauses also included non-severability provi-
sions stipulating that if classwide arbitration was ordered, the
entire arbitration agreement would be invalid? The presence of
these clauses suggests that companies prefer litigation class actions
to classwide arbitration. The revealed preference for litigation in
this context might reflect the perception that arbitrators are more
willing to grant class treatment. Companies may desire to retain
the rights to appeal both class certification and any eventual judg-
ment-rights that are more available in litigation than in
arbitration. Defendants or defense lawyers have substantial experi-
ence in litigating class actions and lack experience with arbitration.
They might also believe that they are more likely to win the case
before a court or jury than before an arbitrator whose instincts
could be to split the difference between the parties' positions. 2
The desire to avoid aggregate dispute resolution procedures also
helps explain the interesting pattern of class action waivers in our
data. 80% of the consumer contracts that had arbitration clauses
also had class action waivers. It is evident, therefore, that the par-
ties who drafted these contracts desired to avoid class actions.
Further, all of the class action waivers in our sample were
51. Classwide arbitrations have been uncommon to date, but some states have ac-
cepted the idea. See, e.g., Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 E Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich. 2000);
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002); Mandel v. Household Bank
(Nev.), Nat'l. Ass'n., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (Ct. App. 2003), review granted and opinion su-
perseded, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 65 P.3d 1284 (Cal. 2003); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539
U.S. 444 (2003). The Supreme Court left the availability of classwide arbitration undecided
in Green Tree. Id. at 449. It is fair to say, however, that classwide arbitration remains a some-
what controversial and poorly developed means for group dispute resolution.
52. SeeLongJohn Silver's Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 409 E Supp. 2d 682, 687-88 (D.S.C.
2006) (applying a deferential standard of review to an arbitrator's lenient class certification
having found certification procedures a matter of contract interpretation rather than state
civil procedure); Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by Consumer
Financial Services Providers, at 12 (2007) (unpublished outline on file with the authors) (advis-
ing company lawyers to avoid class arbitration); Mark J. Levin, Drafting a "Bulletproof"
Arbitration Agreement and Related Practice Issues, at 6 (unpublished outline on file with the
authors) (suggesting that consumer agreement should include a non-severability provision).
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embedded in mandatory arbitration clauses. There were no stand-
alone waivers of class action litigation treatment. Companies
appear to recognize that standalone class action waivers are legally
vulnerable and also politically controversial, and thus include such
waivers only when they can be disguised within the framework of a
purportedly pro-consumer arbitration clause.
Other explanations could be advanced for the differences in ar-
bitration rates between consumer and material nonlabor contracts.
For example, the bargaining explanation for the paucity of arbitra-
tion clauses in business-to-business contracts-the idea that
demanding an arbitration clause sends an undesirable signal about
propensity to breach-is not persuasive in consumer contracts,
where bargaining over contract terms is absent. Because no nega-
tive signal is conveyed, there is no reason, in this theory, to omit an
arbitration clause. While logically possible, we find this explanation
to be implausible. Moreover, while signaling may not be a problem
in consumer contracts, adverse selection could be: if arbitrators
tend to award some recovery even when the complainant's griev-
ance is baseless, the presence of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts might select for customers with a propensity to breach.
Another possible explanation for the pattern we observe is that
companies favor the presumably more costly and more reliable
litigation system for the material contracts that may generate major
litigation. For small consumer contracts with less at risk, companies
are willing to trade access to litigation for the presumably faster,
less costly arbitration system. While we cannot discount the possi-
bility that the schedule of costs and benefits varies according to the
scale or nature of the controversy, it is not obvious why the tradeoff
should favor arbitration for small-scale disputes and litigation for
large-scale ones (small claims court may be just as inexpensive as
arbitration, for example). More importantly, the hypothesis has a
somewhat fictional quality because few consumers will in fact exer-
cise their rights under arbitration clauses.
Our explanation for the observed variance between arbitration
clause rates in consumer and nonconsumer contracts is consistent
with the most significant prior empirical study on the topic, that of
Demaine and Hensler, and also explains differences in reported
arbitration rates in our study and theirs. The 76.9% rate of arbitra-
tion clauses in our sample of consumer contracts contrasts with the
35.4 rate reported by Demaine and Hensler, a difference that is
53. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 5.
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highly statistically significant (p<O.01). 54 The explanation for the
difference appears to lie in the industries studied. Our study is lim-
ited to a fairly narrow range of industries. As described above, only
six major industry groups appear in our sample. Demaine and
Hensler reported on a wider range of consumer contracts. But iso-
lating some of their contract categories yields an interesting
pattern of results.
Demaine and Hensler report on five categories of insurance
contracts (homeowners', renters', auto, health, and life insurance).
Seventeen of twenty-one insurance contracts (80.9%) in their sam-
ple provided for arbitration, with none of the three life insurance
contracts in their sample containing arbitration clauses. Outside
the insurance industry, real estate contracts (two of two contracts),
online retail contracts (three of five contracts), gas credit card con-
tracts (four of five contracts), tour operator contracts (three of five
contracts), contracts with attorneys (two of three contracts), and
financial contracts (eighteen of twenty-six contracts) included arbi-
tration clauses in more than half the contracts studied. A small
minority of contracts in twenty-one other consumer contract cate-
gories had arbitration clauses. In those twenty-one categories, only
eight of ninety-seven contracts (8.2%) had arbitration clauses.
There thus appear to be two classes of consumer contract catego-
ries: those with a substantial portion containing arbitration clauses
and those with a small minority containing such clauses.
Some of the pattern may be explained by industrial concentra-
tion. Our high rate of arbitration clauses appears in financial
services and telecommunications contracts. Demaine and Hensler
similarly report a 69.2% rate of arbitration clauses in financial con-
tracts.' 5 Five credit card issuers dominate their industry,6 three of
whom, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of America, appear
in our consumer contracts data. Similarly, the telecommunications
industry has a high level of industrial concentration. 5' For the typi-
cal consumer today, a mobile phone contract is realistically
available from only a handful of companies, including AT&T,
54. The rate of arbitration clauses in Demaine & Hensler is 35.4% (57 of 161 con-
tracts). Id. at 64.
55. Id. Only the "Accountant/Tax Consultant" subcategory showing less than half the
contracts with arbitration clauses. Id.
56. Douglas Akers at al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit Card Industry, 17
FDIC BANKING REv. 23, 25 tbl.2, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/
2005nov/article2.pdf.
57. E.g., William D. Rahm, Watching Over the Web: A Substantive Equality Regime for Broad-
band Applications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (2007) (noting high level of concentration of
telecommunications and cable companies).
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Alltel, Qwest, Sprint Nextel, and Verizon, all of which appear in
our consumer contracts data.
The variance Demaine and Hensler establish in the cross-
industry use of consumer arbitration clauses can be combined with
industrial concentration data to suggest at least part of the expla-
nation for the pattern of consumer contract arbitration clauses.
Marotta-Wurgler reports an association between industrial concen-
tration in the software industry, as measured by market share, and
pro-seller contract conflict resolution terms, including arbitration
clauses." Industries for which Demaine and Hensler find low arbi-
tration clause rates, including apartment rentals, grocery stores,
cultural/sports events, and restaurants, lack the levels of industrial
concentration present in the credit card and telecommunications
industries.
The low-arbitration-clause rate industries also lack firms with
millions of similarly situated customers affected by central com-
pany policy. In contrast, cell phone and credit card companies face
a substantial economic threat due to their millions of customers.
Intentional or intentional acts that deprive millions of customers of
small amounts threaten financial and telecommunications firms
only if customers can aggregate their claims. Industrial concentra-
tion and the varied risks of aggregate litigation thus suggest an
explanation for the pattern of consumer contract mandatory arbi-
tration clauses.
Finally, what explains the results on jury trial waivers? As noted,
our hypothesis that companies would routinely flee juries was not
confirmed. Consistent with Eisenberg & Miller's earlier study,' our
results suggest that the companies we studied do not, in fact, view
juries as undesirable factfinders for many disputes. The six con-
sumer contracts in our sample that did not have arbitration clauses
contained no waivers of jury trials, a fact which in itself might sug-
gest that the companies involved preferred jury resolution of
consumer contracts. However, when mandatory arbitration clauses
are considered as forms ofjury waiver, these companies are seen to
flee juries at a high rate (76.9%). Our data are thus consistent with
the view that another advantage of mandatory arbitration clauses,
from the standpoint of companies, is that they allow companies to
58. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming September
2008).
59. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 32.
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avoid juries while disguising the fact they are doing so in the form
of an ostensibly consumer-oriented arbitration clause.' °
V. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Our view that consumer arbitration clauses are used as means
for avoiding aggregate dispute resolution finds support in other,
qualitative data. Federal and state courts typically have enforced
arbitration clauses in standard-form consumer agreements unless
they contain specific provisions found to violate state contract law.
Recently, however, some state courts, including California's, have
found class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements to
be unconscionable and therefore contrary to generally applicable
state law, at least when the consumers' claims were too small to
support individual actions." Company lawyers responded to these
adverse decisions by softening other terms pertaining to arbitra-
tion, while retaining the class action waiver. For example,
companies may subsidize the costs of arbitration, use larger print
for arbitration clauses, or may permit customers to opt out of arbi-
tration (within a short time after purchasing the product) .6 The
apparent purpose of these "kinder and gentler" arbitration clauses
is to avoid the appearance of one-sidedness, and thus to protect
both the basic choice of arbitration over litigation and the con-
nected waiver of class proceedings from challenges based on
unconscionability.5 This sequence of judicial decisions and
60. SeeJean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for
the Jury 7ha, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 17 (2003).
61. E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Muhammad v.
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J, 2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161
P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007). Several courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See the more
comprehensive summary of authority cited supra note 16.
62. E.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007 ("Cingular contends that it has cured any concerns
about access to a remedy by promising to pay all AAA filing, administrative, and arbitrator
fees unless the arbitrator finds the claim frivolous, and by promising to pay the attorneys
fees under certain circumstances.").
63. See Levin, supra note 52, at 3, 7-8 ("Ironically, the best way to ensure that [an] arbi-
tration clause will be enforced is to give the consumer or employee the right to reject it").
One recent case, Berensen v. National Financial Services, 485 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2007), might
be taken as evidence that companies prefer to arbitrate, rather than litigate, consumer
claims, even when class action is not an issue. In Bernson, brokerage customers sued Fidelity
for failure to pay interest on funds debited from their account for electronic bill payments
but held for several days before bills were paid. Id. at 37. After the district court refused to
certify the plaintiffs as a class but also refused to grant summary judgment on some of the
plaintiffs' individual claims, Fidelity went on to argue strenuously (but unsuccessfully) for
arbitration of the remaining individual claims. Id. at 38-40 However, Fidelity knew at this
point that the district court viewed the interest claims as potentially viable; therefore its
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contractual responses further suggests that company lawyers have
turned to arbitration as a source of protective cover for class action
waivers.
Moreover, apart from the role of arbitration clauses in shoring
up the validity of class action waivers, it is not clear why consumer
arbitration would appeal to companies. Particularly when the
company has agreed to subsidize a portion of the consumers' costs,
fair arbitration provides little clear advantage for companies. Arbi-
tration may be cheaper, but a cheaper forum invites more claims.
Compensatory claims arising under the types of consumer agree-
ments we studied are inherently limited by the modest stakes of
consumer contracts; therefore, civil juries are unlikely to assess
large damage awards. Companies may worry about punitive dam-
ages in court, but arbitrators are usually capable of awarding
punitive damages, and contractual provisions barring punitive
damages in arbitration increase the chance that the arbitration
clause will be stricken as unconscionable." Companies might also
worry about the res judicata effects ofjudicial decisions in favor of
consumers. Yet the Restatement of Judgments accords the same
effect to adverse outcomes in arbitration as it does to adverse out-
comes in court.65 In any case, collateral estoppel may not be
available if courts (or arbitrators) have reached varied conclusions
in prior cases.6 Finally, it is possible that companies, as repeat play-
ers in arbitration and the source of much business for arbitrators
and the organizations to which they belong, anticipate favoritism
from arbitrators. Yet studies do not show that biased outcomes have
emerged.6' Thus, from the perspective of corporate self-interest,
concern over class actions remains the most likely explanation for
the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer agreements.
On balance, we believe our data support the inference that the
companies in our sample do not view consumer arbitration as
offering a superior combination of cost savings, expeditious
decision-making, consistency, and justice. Rather, they view con-
sumer arbitration as a way to save money by avoiding aggregate
continued stance in favor of arbitration does necessarily support a general preference for
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.
64. Levin, supra note 52, at 8 ("A company might be tempted to put in the clause that
the arbitrator cannot award punitive or exemplary damages. But that is asking for trouble
65. E.g., E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 1181, 1186-87
(R.I. 1994) (holding that the parties to an arbitration proceeding are bound by resjudicata)
(citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 34(1)).
66. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1982)
(refusing to recognize collateral estoppel).
67. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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dispute resolution. Our data do not allow us to draw firm conclu-
sions as to the social utility of this strategy. If aggregate group
dispute resolution, on balance, harms the interests of society (be-
cause, for example, it imposes high transactions costs while
achieving little in the way of deterrence or compensation for
harm), then devices that avoid aggregate treatment, including
mandatory arbitration clauses, can be seen as socially beneficial.
Consumers and others could benefit from these clauses because
companies could pass cost savings on to their customers. On the
other hand if aggregate dispute resolution does have net social
benefits, then devices such as mandatory consumer arbitration
clauses can reduce overall social welfare. These social welfare cal-
culations depend on market conditions beyond the scope of our
study.
CONCLUSION
Corporations regularly defend their use of mandatory consumer
arbitration clauses by asserting arbitration's superior fairness and
efficiency over traditional litigation. However, corporations' selec-
tive use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against
each other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses
may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that
corporations are better serving their customers.
The growth of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears
to be part of a broader initiative by corporations to preclude or
limit aggregate litigation. Other industry-supported statutory initia-
tives-the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") 68 and
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") 69 -have limited or
modified class action practice. But these initiatives merely raised
the bar for successfully aggregating small claims. Notwithstanding
the enactment of the PSLRA and CAFA, many class actions con-
tinue to proceed in both state and federal court.0 In comparison
68. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
69. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756.2 (3d ed. 2005); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2005).
70. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IM-
PACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS (2007)
(assessing evidence of the effects of CAFA on filing claims), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CAFA.Third Interim.pdf; Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits
Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007)
(assessing evidence of the effect of PSLRA on the filing of claims); Kevin M. Clermont &
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to these statutes, mandatory consumer arbitration clauses are more
draconian attacks on aggregate consumer dispute resolution. The
clauses do not merely elevate pleading standards, reform attorney
fees, or promote use of a federal over a state forum, as do the
PSLRA and CAFA. Arbitration clauses seek to completely preclude
aggregation of small plaintiff claims into economically viable ac-
tions. Policy debate about, and judicial assessment of, consumer
arbitration and associated clauses should proceed with this context
in mind.
Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2008) (reporting on CAFA cases in federal court); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits
Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 627,
628 (2007) (stating that securities fraud class actions have returned to and exceeded pre-
PSLRA levels).
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